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Abstract. S-boxes are functions with an input so small that the sim-
plest way to specify them is their lookup table (LUT). How can we
quantify the distance between the behavior of a given S-box and that of
an S-box picked uniformly at random?
To answer this question, we introduce various “anomalies”. These real
numbers are such that a property with an anomaly equal to 𝑎 should
be found roughly once in a set of 2𝑎 random S-boxes. First, we present
statistical anomalies based on the distribution of the coefficients in the
difference distribution table, linear approximation table, and for the first
time, the boomerang connectivity table.
We then count the number of S-boxes that have block-cipher like struc-
tures to estimate the anomaly associated to those. In order to recover
these structures, we show that the most general tool for decomposing
S-boxes is an algorithm efficiently listing all the vector spaces of a given
dimension contained in a given set, and we present such an algorithm.
Combining these approaches, we conclude that all permutations that are
actually picked uniformly at random always have essentially the same
cryptographic properties and the same lack of structure.
Keywords: S-Box, Vector space search, BCT, Shannon effect, Anomaly,
Boolean Functions.
1 Introduction
S-boxes are small functions with an input small enough that they can be specified
by their lookup tables. If 𝐹 is an S-box with an 𝑛-bit input then it is feasible
to describe it using only the sequence 𝐹 (0), 𝐹 (1), ..., 𝐹 (2𝑛 − 1) since, in the vast
majority of the cases, 3 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 8. S-boxes can therefore correspond to arbitrarily
complex functions. In practice, such components are the only source of non-
linearity of many symmetric primitives. Most prominently, the AES [1] uses an
8-bit bijective S-box.
⋆ The full version of this paper is available on eprint (report 2019/528) [10].
The aim of a block cipher is to simulate a pseudo-random permutation (PRP),
meaning that it should not be possible for an attacker given a black box access
to a block cipher with a secret key and to a permutation picked uniformly at
random to figure out which is which. In this context, it might a priori make
intuitive sense for block cipher designers to use (pseudo-)random components
to design their algorithm. However, this approach would have substantial short-
comings in practice. For example, a random S-box is a priori hard to implement
in hardware, random components are unlikely to yield an easy to analyze cipher,
their mediocre properties may imply a higher number of rounds (which would
slow the cipher down), and the seeds used to generate its random components
would have to be published.
Instead, in practice, S-boxes are constructed taking multiple design require-
ments into account. For example, the mathematical properties of this compo-
nent can be leveraged to prove that an algorithm is safe from differential [2] or
linear [29] cryptanalysis. At the same time, the S-box may be intended to be
implemented in hardware or in a bit-sliced fashion, in which case it is necessary
to give it a specific structure that will ease such implementations.
While it is easy to compare the properties of two given S-boxes (we can
simply compute them and then rank them), it is not trivial to quantify how
different they are from an S-box picked uniformly at random with regard to
each of their properties. Informally, the comparison with such an “ideal” object
will quantify the distance between an S-box and random ones: if the property of
the studied S-box is unlikely to occur by chance, then it means that the S-box
is much better (or much worse) than average. In this paper, we build upon a
framework introduced in [6] to provide both definitions and practical means to
compute such probabilities.
Let S2𝑛 be the set of all 𝑛-bit permutations and let 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 . As mentioned
above, there are two sets of properties that are relevant when investigating S-
boxes: how good their cryptographic properties are and whether or not they
have some structure. Hence, in order to compare 𝐹 with a random S-box, we
need to be able to answer the following two questions.
1. What is the probability that an S-box picked uniformly in S2𝑛 has differen-
tial/linear properties at least as good as those of 𝐹?
2. How can we recover the structure of 𝐹 (if it has any)?
Answering the first question can also help us better understand the properties of
random permutations and thus to better estimate the advantage of an adversary
trying to distinguish a (round-reduced) block cipher from a random permutation.
On the other hand, the second one is related to so-called white-box cryptog-
raphy, i.e. to implementation techniques that will hide a secret from an attacker
with a total access to the implementation of the algorithm. In practice, in order
to try and hide for instance an AES key, the attacker will only be given access
to an implementation relying on big lookup tables that hide the details of the
computations. Recovering the original structure of these tables can also be seen
as a particular case of S-box reverse-engineering in the sense of [6].
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1.1 Our Contributions
A Key Concept: Anomalies. We answer the two questions asked above using
different variants of a unique approach based on what we call anomalies. In-
tuitively, an anomaly is a real number that quantifies how unlikely a property
is. For example, there are very few differentially-6 uniform 8-bit permutations,5
meaning that the anomaly of this property should be high. However, we could
argue that what matters in this case is not just the number of differentially-6
uniform permutations but the number of permutations with a differential uni-
formity at most equal to 6. In light of this, we define anomalies as follows.
Definition 1 (Anomaly). Let 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 and let 𝑃 be a function mapping
S2𝑛 to a partially ordered set. The anomaly of 𝑃 (𝐹 ) is defined as A (𝑃 (𝐹 )) =
− log2 (Pr [𝑃 (𝐺) ≤ 𝑃 (𝐹 )]), where the probability is taken over 𝐺 ∈ S2𝑛 . We can
equivalently write
A (𝑃 (𝐹 )) = − log2
(︃⃒⃒{︀





The negative anomaly of 𝑃 (𝐹 ) is A (𝑃 (𝐹 )) = − log2 (Pr [𝑃 (𝐺) ≥ 𝑃 (𝐹 )]).
Regardless of 𝑃 , we always have 2−A(𝑃 (𝐹 )) + 2−A(𝑃 (𝐹 )) = 1 + Pr [𝑃 (𝐺) = 𝑃 (𝐹 )].
In the example given above, 𝑃 is simply the function returning the differential
uniformity of a permutation. The anomaly of the differential uniformity then gets
higher as the differential uniformity of 𝐹 decreases under the median differential
uniformity as there are fewer permutations with a low differential uniformity. At
the same time, the negative anomaly of the differential uniformity increases as
the differential uniformity increases above its median value. To put it differently,
the anomaly of 𝑃 (𝐹 ) quantifies how many S-boxes are at least as good6 as 𝐹
in terms of 𝑃 , and the negative one how many are at least as bad as 𝐹 . In
this paper, we study different anomalies and design new tools that allow their
estimation for any S-box.
A property with a high anomaly can be seen as distinguisher in the usual
sense, i.e. it is a property that differentiates the object studied from one picked
uniformly at random. However, unlike usual distinguishers, we do not care about
the amount of data needed to estimate the probabilities corresponding to the
anomalies.
Statistical Anomalies. In [6] and [34], the notions of “differential” and “linear”
anomalies were introduced. Definition 1 is indeed a generalization of them. They
are based on properties 𝑃 that correspond to how good the differential and linear
properties are. In Section 2, we generalize this analysis to take into account the
corresponding negative anomalies, and we introduce the use of the so-called
5 We formally define differential uniformity later. All that is needed in this discussion
is that the differential uniformity is an integer which is better when lower.
6 In this paper, the properties 𝑃 considered are better when lower.
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Boomerang Connectivity Table (BCT) [17] for this purpose. To this end, we
establish the distribution of the coefficients of the BCT of a random permutation.
As an added bonus, this new result allows a better estimation of the advantage
of an adversary in a boomerang attack.
Structural Anomalies. Anomalies can also be related to the presence of a struc-
ture. For example, for 𝑛-bit Boolean functions, the existence of a simple circuit
evaluating a function is unlikely:
“almost all functions” of 𝑛 arguments have “an almost identical” com-
plexity which is asymptotically equal to the complexity of the most com-
plex function of 𝑛 arguments.
This statement of Lupanov [28] summarizes the so-called Shannon effect [39].
In other words, the existence of a short description is an unlikely event for a
Boolean function. Here, we generalize this observation to permutations of F𝑛2
and construct anomalies that capture how “structured” an S-box is.
In Section 3, we present an estimation of the number of permutations that can
be constructed using common S-box generation methods (multiplicative inverse,
Feistel networks...) and derive the corresponding anomalies. In order to identify
these anomalies, it is necessary to recover said structures when they are unknown.
We present a simple approach applicable to inversion-based S-boxes that we
successfully apply to the 8-bit S-box of the leaked German cipher Chiasmus. In
other cases, we show that the detection of structures with a high anomaly can
be performed using a vector space search.
Vector Space Search. We provide an efficient algorithm performing this search:
given a set 𝒮 of elements of {0, 1}𝑛 and an integer 𝑑, this algorithm returns all
the vector spaces of dimension 𝑑 that are fully contained in 𝒮. We present it in
Section 4. While such an algorithm is needed when looking for a structure in an
S-box, we expect it to find applications beyond this area.
1.2 Mathematical Background
Boolean Functions. Let F2 = {0, 1}. In what follows, we consider the following
subsets of the set of all functions mapping F𝑛2 to itself.
– Recall that the set of all 𝑛-bit permutations is denoted S2𝑛 . It contains 2
𝑛!
elements. The compositional inverse of 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 is denoted 𝐹−1.





For elements of F𝑛2 , “+” denotes the characteristic-2 addition, i.e. the XOR. In
cases that might be ambiguous, we use “⊕” to denote this operation.
Let 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 be an S-box. Many of its cryptographic properties can be
described using 2𝑛 × 2𝑛 tables: the LAT, DDT and BCT. They are defined
below.
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The Linear Approximation Table (LAT) of 𝐹 is the table 𝒲𝐹 with coefficients
𝒲𝐹 (𝑎, 𝑏) =
∑︀
𝑥∈F𝑛2
(−1)𝑎·𝑥+𝑏·𝐹 (𝑥) where 𝑥·𝑦 =
⨁︀𝑛−1
𝑖=0 𝑥𝑖×𝑦𝑖 is the scalar product
of two elements 𝑥 = (𝑥0, ..., 𝑥𝑛−1), 𝑦 = (𝑦0, ..., 𝑦𝑛−1) ∈ F𝑛2 . Its maximum for
𝑏 ̸= 0 is the linearity of 𝐹 and is denoted ℓ(𝐹 ). The LAT is used to study linear
cryptanalysis [40,29]. The set of the coordinates of the coefficients equal to 0
plays a special role, as shown in [15]. It is called the Walsh zeroes of 𝐹 and is
denoted 𝒵𝐹 = {(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ (F𝑛2 )2 | 𝒲𝐹 (𝑎, 𝑏) = 0} ∪ {(0, 0)}.
The Difference Distribution Table (DDT) of 𝐹 is the table 𝛿𝐹 with coeffi-
cients 𝛿𝐹 (𝑎, 𝑏) = # {𝑥 ∈ F𝑛2 , 𝐹 (𝑥 + 𝑎) + 𝐹 (𝑥) = 𝑏}. Its maximum for 𝑎 ̸= 0 is the
differential uniformity of 𝐹 and is denoted 𝑢(𝐹 ). The DDT is needed to study
differential cryptanalysis [3].
Recently, Cid et al. introduced a new tool which they called Boomerang
Connectivity Table (BCT) [17]. It is again a 2𝑛 × 2𝑛 table ℬ𝐹 defined by
ℬ𝐹 (𝑎, 𝑏) = #
{︀
𝑥 ∈ F𝑛2 , 𝐹−1 (𝐹 (𝑥) + 𝑏) + 𝐹−1 (𝐹 (𝑥 + 𝑎) + 𝑏) = 𝑎
}︀
.
Its maximum value for 𝑎, 𝑏 ̸= 0 is the boomerang uniformity of 𝐹 and is denoted
𝛽𝐹 . As hinted by its name, the BCT is relevant when studying boomerang at-
tacks [41]. Unlike the DDT and LAT, it is necessary that 𝐹 is a permutation for
the BCT to be well defined.
Statistics. Some of our results rely on both the binomial and Poisson distribu-
tion. We denote with Binomial(𝑛, 𝑝) the binomial distribution with parameters
𝑝 and 𝑛 which correspond respectively to the probability of an event and to the
number of trial. It is defined as follows:






It has a mean equal to 𝑛𝑝 and a variance of 𝑛𝑝(1− 𝑝). The Poisson distribution
with parameter 𝜆 is defined by




The mean value and variance of this distribution are both 𝜆. A binomial distri-
bution with small 𝑝 can be closely approximated by a Poisson distribution with
𝜆 = 𝑛𝑝.
2 Statistical Properties
Let us consider a permutation 𝐹 that is picked uniformly at random from S2𝑛
and let us consider one of its tables, i.e. its DDT, LAT or BCT. The coeffi-
cients in this table may be connected to one another: for example the sum of
the coefficients in a row of the DDT have to sum to 2𝑛. Yet, in practice, the
coefficients act like independent and identically distributed random variables. In
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Section 2.1), we recall what the distributions of the DDT and LAT coefficients
are and we establish the distribution of the BCT coefficients.
Then, Section 2.2 presents how the knowledge of these distributions can be
used to bound the probability that a random permutation has differential/lin-
ear/boomerang properties at least as good as those of the S-box investigated.
Additionally, we explain in Section 2.3 how our newly gained knowledge of the
distribution of the BCT coefficients allows a better estimation of the advantage
of the attacker in a boomerang attack.
2.1 Coefficient Distributions
In [18], the authors established and experimentally verified the distribution fol-
lowed by the DDT and LAT coefficients. The distribution of the LAT coefficients
was first established in [33] and then provided a different expression in [18]. A
more thorough study of the DDT coefficient can be found in [32]. We recall these
results in the following two theorems.
Proposition 1 (DDT coefficient distribution [18]). The coefficients in
the DDT of a random S-Box of S2𝑛 with 𝑛 ≥ 5 are independent and identically
distributed random variables following a Poisson distribution Poisson(2−1).
Proposition 2 (LAT coefficient distribution [33,18]). The coefficients in
the LAT of a random permutation7 of S2𝑛 are independent and identically dis-
tributed random variables with the following probability distribution:








The situation is the same for the BCT. In order to establish the distribution
of the non-trivial coefficients of the BCT of a random permutation, we first recall
an alternative definition of the BCT that was introduced in [26].
Proposition 3 (Alternative BCT definition [26]). Let 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 be a per-
mutation. For any 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ F𝑛2 , the entry ℬ𝐹 (𝑎, 𝑏) of the BCT of 𝐹 is given by the
number of solutions in F𝑛2 × F𝑛2 of the following system of equations{︃
𝐹−1(𝑥 + 𝑏) + 𝐹−1(𝑦 + 𝑏) = 𝑎
𝐹−1(𝑥) + 𝐹−1(𝑦) = 𝑎 .
(1)
We use this theorem to obtain the distribution of the coefficients in the BCT.
Theorem 1 (BCT coefficient distribution). If 𝐹 is picked uniformly at
random in S2𝑛 , then its coefficients with 𝑎, 𝑏 ̸= 0 can be modeled like independent
and identically distributed random variables with the following distribution:




7 The distribution of the coefficients in the LAT of random functions (not permuta-
tions) is also provided in [18].
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and 𝑃2(𝑖) = Binomial
(︁
𝑖; 22𝑛−2 − 2𝑛−1, 1(2𝑛−1)2
)︁
.
Proof. For any 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ F𝑛2 such that 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦, we define
𝑆𝑥,𝑦 = {(𝑥, 𝑦), (𝑦, 𝑥), (𝑥 + 𝑏, 𝑦 + 𝑏), (𝑦 + 𝑏, 𝑥 + 𝑏)} ,
which is of cardinality 4 unless 𝑥 + 𝑦 = 𝑏, in which case it only contains 2
elements. These sets are such that a pair (𝑥, 𝑦) is a solution of System (1) if and
only if all the elements in 𝑆𝑥,𝑦 are as well. In order to prove this theorem, we
will partition the set of all pairs of elements of F𝑛2 into such sets 𝑆𝑥,𝑦.
To this end, we consider the following equivalence relation: (𝑥, 𝑦) ∼ (𝑥′, 𝑦′) if
and only if the multisets 𝑆𝑥,𝑦 and 𝑆𝑥′,𝑦′ are identical. The corresponding equiva-
lence classes are of size 4 except when 𝑥+𝑦 = 𝑏, in which case they contain only 2
elements. There are in total 2𝑛−1 classes of size 2. As there are 2𝑛(2𝑛−1) ordered
pairs of elements in F𝑛2 , we deduce that there are
(︀
2𝑛(2𝑛 − 1) − 2 × 2𝑛−1
)︀
/4
classes of cardinality 4, i.e. 22𝑛−2 − 2𝑛−1.
Then, in order for System (1) to have exactly 𝑐 solutions, we need that there
exists 𝑖1 solutions in classes of size 4 and 𝑖2 in classes of size 2, where 2𝑖1+4𝑖2 = 𝑐.
We deduce that




where 𝑃1(𝑖1) (respectively 𝑃2(𝑖2)) is the probability that there exists 𝑖1 classes
of size 4 (resp. 2) that are solutions of System (1). Let us now prove that the
distributions of 𝑃1(𝑖1) and 𝑃2(𝑖2) are as stated in the theorem.
Size 2. In this case, it holds that 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑏 so that the lines of System (1)
are identical. We assume that 𝐹−1(𝑥) + 𝐹−1(𝑥 + 𝑏) = 𝑎 holds with probability
1/(2𝑛 − 1) as 𝐹−1(𝑥) + 𝐹−1(𝑥 + 𝑏) can take any value in F𝑛2∖{0}. Since there
are 2𝑛−1 such pairs, 𝑃1(𝑖1) corresponds to a binomial distribution with 2
𝑛−1
repetitions of a Bernoulli trial that succeeds with probability (2𝑛 − 1)−1.
Size 4. The two equations of System (1) are now independent. Using the same
reasoning as above, we assume that each line holds with probability 1/(2𝑛 −
1). Since there are 22𝑛−2 − 2𝑛−1 such pairs, 𝑃2(𝑖2) corresponds to a binomial
distribution with parameters 22𝑛−2 − 2𝑛−1 and (2𝑛 − 1)−2.
⊓⊔
2.2 Anomalies in Table Coefficients Distributions
Building upon the general approach presented in [6], we can define several
anomalies using the distribution of the coefficients in the tables of a permuta-
tion 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 . We will then be able to estimate the values of the corresponding
anomalies using the distributions derived in the previous section.
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Maximum Value. For any table, the maximum absolute value of all coefficients
is a natural property to use to construct an anomaly as the integers are ordered.
Let max𝑇 : S2𝑛 → N be the function mapping a permutation 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 to the
maximum absolute value of the non-trivial coefficients in a table 𝑇 . Then we can
use the distributions in Propositions 1 and 2 as well as Theorem 1 to estimate
the associated anomalies:





where 𝑝𝑖 is the probability that 𝑇 (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑖. Indeed, there are only (2
𝑛 − 1)2
non-trivial coefficients in the DDT, LAT and BCT as the first row and column
are fixed in each case. The (negative) anomalies corresponding to the differen-
tial uniformity, linearity and boomerang uniformity for 𝑛 = 8 are given in the
appendix of the full version of this paper [10].
Maximum Value and Number of Occurrences. In S28 , the anomaly of a differ-
ential uniformity of 8 is equal to 16.2 but, for a differential uniformity of 6, it is
164.5. In order to have a finer grained estimate of how unlikely the properties of
an S-box are, we combine the maximum coefficient in one of its tables with its
number of occurrences as was first done in [6]. For a 2𝑛 × 2𝑛 table of integers
𝑇 , let MO be the function such that MO(𝑇 ) = (𝑐,𝑚) where 𝑐 is the maximum
absolute value in 𝑇 and 𝑚 is its number of occurrences (where the first row and
column are ignored). The set N×N in which the output of MO lives can be or-
dered using the lexicographic ordering, i.e. (𝑥, 𝑦) ≤ (𝑥′, 𝑦′) if and only if 𝑥 < 𝑥′
or 𝑥 = 𝑥′ and 𝑦 ≤ 𝑦′. We then define the differential, linear and boomerang
anomalies of 𝐹 as respectively
Ad(𝐹 ) = A (MO(𝛿𝐹 ))) , A
ℓ(𝐹 ) = A (MO(𝒲𝐹 )) , and Ab(𝐹 ) = A (MO(ℬ𝐹 )) .
This definition of the differential and linear anomalies matches with the one
given in [34]. The boomerang anomaly was not used before. We also introduce
the negative differential, linear and boomerang anomalies as the corresponding
negative anomalies.
We estimate these anomalies for a table 𝑇 using the following expression:
A
(︀














where 𝑝𝑖 is the probability that 𝑇 (𝑎, 𝑏) = |𝑖|. For the corresponding negative
anomaly, we use the following relation:












2.3 Tighter Advantage Estimations for Boomerang Attacks
The coefficient distribution we established in Theorem 1 can also be used to
compute the expected value of a BCT coefficient. This in turn implies a better
understanding of the advantage an adversary has in a boomerang attack.
Theorem 2. The expected value for each BCT coefficient of a random permu-
tation of S2𝑛 converges towards 2 as 𝑛 increases.
Proof. Let 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 be picked uniformly at random. The expected value 𝐸 of
ℬ𝐹 (𝑎, 𝑏) is
∑︀2𝑛
𝑐=0 Pr [ℬ𝐹 (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐] 𝑐. Using Theorem 1, we express Pr [ℬ𝐹 (𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝑐]
















(2𝑖1 + 4𝑖2)𝑃1(𝑖1)𝑃2(𝑖2) × [2𝑖1 + 4𝑖2 = 𝑐] ,
where the expression between the brackets is equal to 1 if 2𝑖1 + 4𝑖2 = 𝑐, and 0










[2𝑖1 + 4𝑖2 = 𝑐]⏟  ⏞  
≤1
. (2)
We then approximate the binomial distributions 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 by Poisson distribu-
tions, namely 𝑃1(𝑖) ≈ Poisson(𝑖; 2−1) = 𝑒−
1
2 2−𝑖/(𝑖!) and 𝑃1(𝑖) ≈ Poisson(𝑖; 4−1) =
𝑒−
1














































As all sums converge towards 1 as 𝑛 increases, the limit of 𝐸(𝑛) is 2. On the









[2𝑖1 + 4𝑖2 = 𝑐]⏟  ⏞  
=1
= 𝐸(𝑛− 1) ,
so 𝐸(𝑛− 1) ≤ 𝐸 ≤ 𝐸(𝑛). As 𝐸(𝑛) converges to 2 as 𝑛 increases, so does 𝐸. ⊓⊔
The expected probability of a boomerang characteristic 𝐸−1𝑘 (𝐸𝑘(𝑥) ⊕ 𝑏) ⊕
𝐸−1𝑘 (𝐸𝑘(𝑥⊕ 𝑎) ⊕ 𝑏) = 𝑎 is thus 21−𝑛 and not 2−𝑛 as we might expect.
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2.4 Experimental Results
Verification. To check the validity of our approach to estimate the statistical
anomalies, we picked 221 permutations from S28 uniformly at random. We then
counted the number 𝑁𝑡 of permutations 𝐹 such that ⌊A(𝐹 )⌋ = 𝑡, and we obtained
the following results (only anomalies above 19 are listed):
Aℓ(𝐹 ) : 𝑁19 = 1, 𝑁21 = 1 A
ℓ
(𝐹 ) : 𝑁19 = 1
Ad(𝐹 ) : See below A
d
(𝐹 ) : 𝑁20 = 1
Ab(𝐹 ) : 𝑁19 = 3 A
b
(𝐹 ) : 𝑁20 = 2 .
We deduce that the anomalies other than Ad(𝐹 ) behave as we expect: in a set
of size 2𝑡, we can expect to see about 1 permutation with an anomaly of 𝑡.
However, for Ad(𝐹 ), our results do not quite match the theory. Indeed, we
have found too many permutations with a high differential anomaly for it to be
a coincidence:
Ad(𝐹 ) : 𝑁19 = 7, 𝑁20 = 8, 𝑁21 = 2, 𝑁22 = 1, 𝑁23 = 2,
𝑁24 = 1, 𝑁25 = 1, 𝑁26 = 1, 𝑁28 = 1 .
Recall that our estimates of the table-based anomalies rely on the assumption
that the coefficients behave like independent random variables. While we ex-
perimentally found this assumption to yield accurate models in practice for all
tables, it fails to accurately predict the behavior of the maximum value and its
number of occurrences in the case of the DDT.
S-boxes from the Literature. We computed the statistical anomalies we defined
above for several 8-bit S-boxes from the literature that we obtained from [36].
The results are given in Table 1. We also list the number 𝑁𝑉 of vector spaces of
dimension 𝑛 contained in 𝒵𝑠; its importance will appear later in Section 3.
The statistical anomalies of the AES S-box, i.e. of the multiplicative inverse,
are unsurprisingly very large. But they are too large: an anomaly cannot be
higher than log2(|S2𝑛 |). Our estimates do not hold for objects with properties
as extreme as those of the inverse.
We can derive other results from this table. For example, 2-round SPNs have a
high negative boomerang anomaly but 3-round ones loose this property. Classical
3-round Feistel networks, as used in ZUC S0, have a boomerang uniformity which
is maximum [12] so it is not surprising to see that they have a boomerang
anomaly so high that we could not compute it. Even though the S-box of Zorro
has a modified Feistel structure (it uses a sophisticated bit permutation rather
than a branch swap), it still has a high negative boomerang anomaly.
As expected, the S-boxes that were generated using a random procedure have
low positive and negative statistical anomalies. The S-box of MD2 was obtained
using the digits of 𝜋, that of the newDES from the American declaration of
independence, and that of Turing from the string “Alan Turing”.
The correlation between the different statistical anomalies seems complex.
On the one hand, there are S-boxes with very different linear and differential
10







Inverse AES 7382.13 0.00 3329.43 0.00 9000.05 0.00 2
Logarithm BelT 74.79 0.00 122.97 0.00 0.98 0.40 2
TKlog Kuznyechik 80.63 0.00 34.35 0.00 14.18 0.00 3
SPN (2S)
CLEFIA S0 2.56 0.19 25.62 0.00 0.00 15.60 6
Enocoro 1.92 0.36 3.26 0.15 0.00 15.60 6
Twofish p0 1.36 0.70 3.16 0.17 0.00 33.84 6
Twofish p1 1.34 0.72 3.16 0.17 0.00 25.82 6
SPN (3S)
Iceberg 17.15 0.00 3.58 0.10 0.02 3.87 2
Khazad 16.94 0.00 3.16 0.17 0.98 0.40 2
Feistel
Zorro 2.19 0.27 3.37 0.13 0.00 25.82 2
ZUC S0 16.15 0.00 3.16 0.17 0.00 NaN 368
Hill climbing
Kalyna pi0 104.22 0.00 235.77 0.00 29.67 0.00 2
Kalyna pi1 122.64 0.00 268.07 0.00 29.67 0.00 2
Kalyna pi2 129.87 0.00 239.28 0.00 5.99 0.00 2
Kalyna pi3 122.64 0.00 242.92 0.00 26.44 0.00 2
Random
Turing 0.18 1.94 1.84 0.17 0.98 0.40 2
MD2 1.36 0.70 0.10 2.41 0.98 0.40 2
newDES 0.44 0.73 0.32 1.95 0.14 1.86 2
Unknown Skipjack 0.18 1.94 54.38 0.00 0.98 0.40 2
Table 1: The statistical anomalies and number of vector spaces for some S-boxes
from the literature.
anomalies despite the fact that the square of the LAT coefficients corresponds
to the Fourier transform of the DDT (see e.g. Skipjack). As evidenced by the
anomalies of the S-boxes of Kalyna, which were obtained using a hill climbing
method optimizing the differential and linear properties [25], these improvements
lead to an observable increase of the boomerang anomaly but it can be marginal.
3 Identifying Structures
In this section, we go through the most common S-box structures, and present for
each of them the density of the set of such S-boxes (up to affine-equivalence) and
the methods that can be used to identify them. In practice, S-boxes operating
on at least 6 bits usually fall into two categories: those that are based on the
inverse in the finite field F2𝑛 , and those using block cipher structures.
In both cases, the permutations are usually composed with affine permu-
tations. In the context of white-box cryptography, it is common to compose
functions with secret affine permutations so as to obfuscate the logic of the op-
erations used. Hence, for both decomposing S-boxes and attacking white-box
implementation, it is necessary to be able to remove these affine layers.
While recovering a monomial structure is simple even when it is masked by
affine permutations (see Section 3.1 and our results on the S-box of Chiasmus),
it is not the case with block cipher structures. In this section, we show how the
the recovery of the pattern used in [7] to remove the affine layers of the Russian
S-box can be efficiently automatized (Section 3.2), and applied to both SPNs
(Section 3.3) and Feistel network (Section 3.4). The core algorithm needed for
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these attacks is one returning all the vector spaces contained in a set of elements
of F𝑛2 . We will present such an algorithm in Section 4.
These techniques allow us to identify the structural anomalies in S-boxes. In
order to estimate the anomaly associated with each structure, we upper bound
the number of permutation that can be built using each of those that we consider.
The corresponding anomalies are summarized in Section 3.5.
3.1 Multiplicative Inverse
Such permutations have a very simple structure: there exists two affine per-
mutations 𝐴 : F𝑛2 → F2𝑛 and 𝐵 : F2𝑛 → F𝑛2 such that the permutations 𝐹
can be written 𝐹 = 𝐵 ∘ 𝐺 ∘ 𝐴, where 𝐺 is the permutation of F2𝑛 defined by
𝐺(𝑥) = 𝑥2
𝑛−2. Their use was introduced in [31]; the AES [1] uses such an S-box.
In practice, the implementation of 𝐺 requires the use of an encoding of the
elements of F2𝑛 as elements of F𝑛2 . Usually, it is achieved by mapping 𝑥 =
(𝑥0, ..., 𝑥𝑛−1) ∈ F𝑛2 to
∑︀𝑛−1
𝑖=0 𝑥𝑖𝛼
𝑖, where 𝛼 ∈ F2𝑛 is the root of an irreducible
polynomial with coefficients in F2 of degree 𝑛. However, this encoding can be
seen as being part of 𝐴 and 𝐵.
Density of the set. There is only one function 𝑥 ↦→ 𝑥2𝑛−2. However, there are
fewer than (|ℒ2𝑛 |2𝑛)2 distinct permutations affine-equivalent to it. Indeed, (𝑥×
𝑚)2
𝑛−2 = 𝑥2
𝑛−2×𝑚2𝑛−2, meaning that for a given pair (𝐴,𝐵) of permutations of
ℒ2𝑛 we can define 2𝑛−1 pairs (𝐴𝑖, 𝐵𝑖) ∈ (ℒ2𝑛)2 such that 𝐵𝑖∘𝐺∘𝐴𝑖 = 𝐵𝑗∘𝐺∘𝐴𝑗







. In the end, there are at most
|ℒ2𝑛 |2⏟  ⏞  
𝐿𝐴 and 𝐿𝐵
× 22𝑛⏟ ⏞ 
𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵
× 1
(2𝑛 − 1)⏟  ⏞  
multiplication






distinct permutations affine-equivalent to the multiplicative inverse.
How to recognize them? The Chinese cipher SMS4 [20] uses an 8-bit S-box whose
structure was not explained. This prompted Liu et al. to try and recover said
structure [27]. They successfully identified it as being affine equivalent to the
multiplicative inverse using an ad hoc method.
There is a simple test that can be applied to check if a permutation is affine-
equivalent to the multiplicative inverse when the input/output size is even.
Lemma 1. Let 𝑠 : 𝑥 ↦→ 𝑥2𝑛−2 be a permutation of F2𝑛 and 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 with 𝑛 even
be such that 𝐹 = 𝐵 ∘ 𝑠 ∘ 𝐴 where 𝐴 : 𝑥 ↦→ 𝐿𝐴(𝑥) + 𝑐𝐴 and 𝐵 : 𝑥 ↦→ 𝐿𝐵(𝑥) + 𝑐𝐵
are affine permutations. Let {(𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖)} be the set of all coordinates such that
𝛿𝐹 (𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖) = 4. Then it holds that 𝑏𝑖 = 𝐿𝐵
(︀
𝐿𝐴(𝑎𝑖)
2𝑛−2)︀ for all 𝑖, meaning that
𝑎𝑖 ↦→ 𝑏𝑖 and 𝑠 are identical up to translations.
Proof. We have that (𝑥 + 𝑎)𝑒 + 𝑥𝑒 = 𝑏 has as many solutions as (𝑦 + 1)𝑒 +
𝑦𝑒 = 𝑏/𝑎𝑒, meaning that all rows of its DDT contain the same coefficients:
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𝛿𝑠(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝛿𝑠(1, 𝑏/𝑎
𝑒). In the case of the inverse for 𝑛 even, 𝛿𝑠(1, 𝑐) ∈ {0, 2} for
all 𝑐 ̸= 1 and 𝛿𝑠(1, 1) = 4. Such a function was called locally-APN in [9].






. Using the property




where the second coordinate simplifies into 𝐿−1𝐵 (𝑏) × 𝐿𝐴(𝑎). As a consequence,
𝛿𝐹 (𝑎, 𝑏) = 4 if and only if 𝐿
−1
𝐵 (𝑏) = (𝐿𝐴(𝑎))
2𝑛−2





In [38] and [37], two separate teams independently recovered the secret block
cipher Chiasmus from an encryption tool called GSTOOL. Chiasmus is a German
designed 64-bit block cipher which uses two S-boxes 𝑆 and 𝑆−1. Schuster had
the intuition that it was built similarly to the AES S-box. He was right. Using
Lemma 1 and the linear equivalence algorithm of [4], we found that the S-box of
Chiasmus is also based on a finite field inversion. However, unlike in the AES, it
uses two affine mappings with non-zero constants. A script generating the S-box
of Chiasmus is provided in the appendix of the full version of this paper [10].
The S-box itself can be found in a SAGE [19] module [36].
We could also have recovered this structure using directly the algorithm of
Biryukov et al. [4] or the more recent one of Dinur [21]. However, the above
approach and these algorithms share the same shortcoming when it comes to
identifying the structure in an unknown S-box 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 : if we do not know the
exact S-box to which 𝐹 might be affine-equivalent then they cannot be applied.
Even if we know that it might be affine-equivalent to an SPN or a Feistel network,
we cannot find the corresponding affine masks.
To solve this problem, we identify patterns in the LAT of the permutations
with specific structures that are present regardless of the subfunctions they con-
tain. As a consequence, they can always be detected.
3.2 TU-Decomposition
The TU-decomposition is a general structure that was first introduced in [7]
where it was shown that the S-box of the latest Russian standards has such
a structure. Later, it was encountered again in the context of the Big APN
problem, a long standing open question in discrete mathematics. Indeed, the
only known solution to this problem is a sporadic 6-bit APN permutation that
was found by Dillon et al. [13] and which was proved in [35] to yield a TU-
decomposition. This structure was then further decomposed to obtain the so-
called open butterfly. As we will show below, some Feistel and SPN structures
also share this decomposition. Thus, the tools that can find TU-decomposition
can also be used to identify these structures even in the presence of affine masks.
Definition 2 (TU𝑡-decomposition). Let 𝑛 and 𝑡 be integers such that 0 < 𝑡 <
𝑛. We say that 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 has a TU𝑡-decomposition8 if there exists:
8 This is a simplified version of the TU𝑡-decomposition compared to [15]. Indeed, in
that paper, the authors only impose that 𝑇𝑦 ∈ S2𝑛−𝑡 ; 𝑈𝑥 may have collisions. Since
we are only considering bijective S-boxes here, we consider that 𝑈𝑥 ∈ S2𝑡 .
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– a family of 2𝑛−𝑡 permutations 𝑇𝑦 ∈ S2𝑡 indexed by 𝑦 ∈ F𝑛−𝑡2 ,
– a family of 2𝑡 permutations 𝑈𝑥 ∈ S2𝑛−𝑡 indexed by 𝑥 ∈ F𝑡2, and
– two linear permutations 𝜇 : F𝑛2 → (F𝑡2 × F𝑛−𝑡2 ) and 𝜂 : (F𝑡2 × F
𝑛−𝑡
2 ) → F𝑛2





. This structure is presented in Figure 1a.
In other words, 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 has a TU𝑡-decomposition if and only if it is affine-
equivalent to 𝐺 ∈ S2𝑛 with the following property: if 𝐺𝑡 is the restriction of
𝐺 to its 𝑡 bits of highest weight then 𝑥 ↦→ 𝐺𝑡(𝑥||𝑎) is a permutation for all




























(b) Composing its components with linear permutations.
Fig. 1: Two functionally equivalent permutations.
Density of the set. In order to define a permutation with a TU𝑡-decomposition,
we need to choose 2𝑛−𝑡 permutations of S2𝑡 , 2
𝑡 permutations of S2𝑛−𝑡 and two
linear permutations operating on 𝑛 bits. However, several of the permutations
generated in this way will be identical. Indeed, we can compose each 𝑇𝑦 with a
𝑡-bit linear permutation 𝛼 ∈ ℒ2𝑡 to obtain a permutation 𝑇 ′𝑦 = 𝑇𝑦 ∘ 𝛼. If we use
𝑇 ′𝑦 and compose 𝜇 with 𝛼
−1, then we obtain the same overall permutation as
when 𝑇𝑦 and 𝜇 are used. More equivalent modifications can be made using linear
permutations 𝛽 ∈ ℒ2𝑛−𝑡 , 𝛾 ∈ ℒ2𝑡 and 𝛿 ∈ ℒ2𝑛−𝑡 , as summarized in Figure 1b.
Hence, the total number of 𝑛-bit permutations with TU𝑡-decompositions is at
most
#TU𝑡 ≤ |S2𝑡 |2
𝑛−𝑡⏟  ⏞  
𝑇𝑦
× |S2𝑛−𝑡 |2




|ℒ2𝑡 | × |ℒ2𝑛−𝑡 |
)︂2
⏟  ⏞  
𝜇 and 𝜂
.
This quantity is only a bound as permutations that are self affine-equivalent
lead to identical permutations with different 𝜇 and 𝜂. We used this bound to
compute the anomaly associated to the presence of a TU𝑡-decomposition in a
permutation. It is given in Section 2.
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How to recognize them? Let 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 be a permutation. As was established in
Proposition 6 of [15], the presence of a TU𝑡-decomposition is equivalent to the
presence of a specific vector space of zeroes of dimension 𝑛 in 𝒵𝐹 . Let us first
recall the corresponding proposition in the particular case of permutations.
Proposition 4 ([15]). Let 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 and let 𝒵𝐹 be its Walsh zeroes. Then 𝐹
has a TU𝑡-decomposition without any affine layers if and only if 𝒵𝐹 contains the
vector space {︀
(0||𝑎, 𝑏||0), 𝑎 ∈ F𝑡2, 𝑏 ∈ F𝑛−𝑡2
}︀
.
The advantage of Proposition 4 is that the pattern described depends only on
the presence of a TU𝑡-decomposition and not on the specifics of the components
𝑇 and 𝑈 . Furthermore, recall that if 𝐺 = 𝐿2∘𝐹 ∘𝐿1 for some linear permutations
𝐿1 and 𝐿2 then 𝒲𝐺(𝑎, 𝑏) = 𝒲𝐹
(︀
(𝐿−11 )
𝑇 (𝑎), 𝐿𝑇2 (𝑏)
)︀
.
Corollary 1. Let 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 and let 𝒵𝐹 be its Walsh zeroes. Then 𝐹 has a TU𝑡-
decomposition with linear permutations 𝜇 and 𝜂 if and only if{︀(︀
(𝜇−1)𝑇 (0, 𝑎), 𝜂𝑇 (𝑏, 0)
)︀
, 𝑎 ∈ F𝑡2, 𝑏 ∈ F𝑛−𝑡2
}︀
⊂ 𝒵𝐹 .
It is therefore sufficient to look for all the vector spaces of dimension 𝑛
contained in 𝒵𝐹 to see if 𝐹 has TU𝑡-decomposition. If we find a vector space that
is not the Cartesian product of a subspace of {(𝑥, 0), 𝑥 ∈ F𝑛2} with a subspace
of {(0, 𝑦), 𝑦 ∈ F𝑛2} then 𝐹 does not have a TU𝑡-decomposition but there exists
a linear function 𝐿 of F𝑛2 such that 𝐹 + 𝐿 does [15]. Regardless, the key tool
that allows the search for TU-decomposition is an efficient algorithm returning
all the vector spaces of a given dimension that are contained in a set of elements
of F𝑛2 . Indeed, finding such vector spaces will allow us to recover all the values
of (𝜇−1)𝑇 (0, 𝑎) and 𝜂𝑇 (𝑏, 0) for (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ F𝑡2 × F𝑛−𝑡2 , from which we will deduce
information about 𝜇 and 𝜂. We present such an algorithm in Section 4 and we
used it as a subroutine of program finding a TU𝑡-decomposition automatically
(see the appendix of the full version [10]).
As observed in [15], the number of vector spaces of dimension 𝑛 in 𝒵𝐹 is the
same as the number of vector spaces of dimension 𝑛 in the set of the coordinates
of the zeroes in the DDT. Thus, we could equivalently present our results in
terms of DDT.
3.3 Substitution-Permutation Networks
An 𝑛-bit SPN interleaves the parallel application of 𝑘 possibly distinct 𝑚-bit S-
boxes with 𝑛-bit linear permutations, where 𝑘×𝑚 = 𝑛. We use the common [8]
notation 𝐴𝑆 to denote a linear layer followed by an S-box layer. A 𝑆𝐴𝑆 structure
is depicted in Figure 2a.
Let us estimate the number of 𝑟-round SPNs. As the S-box layers are inter-
leaved with linear layers, we need to consider not the size of S2𝑚 but instead
















(b) A 3-round Feistel network.
Fig. 2: Two block-cipher-like S-box structures.






× |ℒ2𝑛 |𝑟+1 .
The corresponding anomalies for some values of 𝑛 are given in Section 3.5.
How to recognize them? First of all, the algebraic degree of a 2-round SPN is at
most equal to 𝑛 − 2 [11]. Hence, if a permutation is of degree 𝑛 − 1, it cannot
have such a structure.
In Theorem 3, we will establish the existence of specific vector space of zeroes
in the LAT of a 2-round SPN. However, in order to properly state this theorem,
we first need to introduce the following notion.
Definition 3 (𝑚-Valid minors). Let 𝑘,𝑚 and 𝑛 be integers such that 𝑛 =
𝑘 × 𝑚. Let 𝐿 ∈ ℒ2𝑛 be a linear permutation. We define it using a 𝑘2 block
matrices 𝐿𝑖,𝑗 of dimension 𝑚×𝑚:
𝐿 =
⎡⎣ 𝐿0,0 ... 𝐿0,𝑘−1... ...
𝐿𝑘−1,0 ... 𝐿𝑘−1,𝑘−1
⎤⎦ .
We call a minor of the matrix 𝐿 𝑚-valid if there exists a pair 𝐼, 𝐽 of subsets of
{0, ..., 𝑘− 1} which are of the same size 0 < |𝐼| = |𝐽 | < 𝑘 and such that the rank
of 𝐿𝐼,𝐽 = [𝐿𝑖,𝑗 ]𝑖∈𝐼,𝑗∈𝐽 is equal to 𝑚.
In other words, an 𝑚-valid minor of 𝐿 is a non-trivial minor of 𝐿 that is obtained
by taking complete 𝑚-bit chunks of this matrix, and which has maximum rank.
Theorem 3. Let 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 be an ASASA structure built using 𝐿 as its central
linear layer and two layers of 𝑚-bit S-boxes. For each 𝐼, 𝐽 ( {0, ..., 𝑘−1} defining
an 𝑚-valid minor of 𝐿, there exists a vector space of zeroes of dimension 𝑛 in
𝒵𝐹 .
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Proof. Because of Corollary 1, we restrict ourselves to the 𝑆𝐴𝑆 structure. If we
let the input blocks corresponding to the indices in 𝐼 take all 2𝑚|𝐼| possible
values, then the output blocks with indices in 𝐽 will also take all 2𝑚|𝐽| = 2𝑚|𝐼|
possible values. There is thus a corresponding TU𝑚|𝐼|-decomposition and hence
a corresponding vector space in 𝒵𝐹 .
This verification is less efficient than the dedicated cryptanalysis methods
presented in [30]. However, the aim here is not so much to recover the ASASA
structure used, it is rather to identify the S-box as having such a structure in the






= 6 for several S-boxes in Table 1: it is a direct consequence of their
2-round SPN structure and of the strong diffusion of their inner linear layer.
Corollary 2. Let 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 be the SAS structure built using 𝐿 as its linear layer
and two layers of 𝑚-bit S-boxes, where 𝑛 = 𝑘×𝑚. If 𝐿 is MDS over the alphabet





vector spaces of dimension 𝑛.
Proof. As 𝐿 is MDS, all its minors and in particular those corresponding to the













𝑚-minors, to which we add the “free” vector space {(𝑥, 0), 𝑥 ∈ F𝑛2} which is












vector spaces in 𝒵𝐹 .
3.4 Feistel Networks
The Feistel structure is a classical block cipher construction which is summarized
in Figure 2b. The number of permutations that are affine-equivalent to 𝑟-round
Feistel networks that use permutations as the round functions is at most equal
to




⌈𝑛2 ⌉⏟  ⏞  
constants
× |ℒ2𝑛 |2⏟  ⏞  
outer layers
× 1
|ℒ2𝑛/2 |2⏟  ⏞  
branch transforms
.
Indeed, we can apply 𝑛/2-bit linear permutations 𝐿 and 𝐿′ to each branch and,
provided that the round functions are modified, we can cancel them out by
applying 𝐿−1 and (𝐿′)−1 on the output branches. We can also add constants
freely to the output of the first ⌈𝑟/2⌉ round functions, as explained in [5].
How to recognize them? There are efficient function-recovery techniques for up
to 5-round Feistel networks [5]. However, as soon as affine masks are added,
the corresponding techniques can no longer be applied. Still, as with the SPN
structure, Feistel networks with few rounds exhibit specific vector spaces in their
Walsh zeroes as was already observed for 4-round Feistel network in [7]. This
means that it is possible to detect such structures using the vector spaces in
their Walsh zeroes.
Theorem 4 ([7]). Let 𝐹 be a 4-round Feistel network such that round functions
2 and 3 are permutations. Then 𝒲𝐹 (𝑥||𝑦, 0||𝑦) = 0 for all 𝑥, 𝑦 in F𝑛/22 .
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This observation also holds for a 3-round Feistel. In fact, there are more vector
spaces in such a structure.
Theorem 5. Let 𝐹0, 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 be functions of F𝑛/22 such that 𝐹1 ∈ S2𝑛/2 . Let
𝐹 ∈ F𝑛2 be the 3-round Feistel network using 𝐹0, 𝐹1 and 𝐹2 as its round functions.
Then the set 𝒵𝐹 contains the following vector spaces of dimension 𝑛:
1. {(𝑥, 0), 𝑥 ∈ F𝑛2}, {(0, 𝑦), 𝑦 ∈ F𝑛2},
2.
{︀































the fourth category being present if 𝐹0 and 𝐹2 are in ∈ S2𝑛/2 .
The proof of this theorem follows from direct applications of results in [15] and
of these observations:
– if the 3-round Feistel network implies a specific vector space, it also implies
the one with the coordinates swapped because its inverse is also a 3-round
Feistel network,
– (𝑥, 𝑦) ↦→ 𝐹 (𝑥, 𝑦) ⊕ (𝑥, 0) is a permutation if 𝐹1 ∈ S2𝑛/2 , and
– (𝑥, 𝑦) ↦→ 𝐹 (𝑥, 𝑦) ⊕ (0, 𝑦) has a TU𝑛/2-decomposition if 𝐹2 ∈ S2𝑛/2 .
The details are provided in the appendix of the full version [10].
3.5 Structural Anomalies
In light of our results, we can quantify the anomaly associated to the presence of
various structures. In this case, the mapping 𝑃 considered maps S2𝑛 to {0, 1}:
a permutation has a specific structure or it does not. The anomaly associated to
a given structure is then
Astructure = − log2
(︃⃒⃒





meaning that the set sizes we extracted above allow us to quantify the anomalies
associated to the TU𝑡-decomposition, the SPN structure, the Feistel network and
the TKlog (see below for the latter). The corresponding anomalies are summa-
rized in Table 2 for different values of 𝑛.
The existence of a TU-decomposition with 𝑡 = 1 for 𝐹 ∈ S2𝑛 is equivalent
to the presence of a component with a linear structure [15], i.e. to the existence
of 𝑎 ∈ F𝑛2 such that the Boolean function 𝑥 ↦→ 𝑎 ·𝐹 (𝑥) has a probability 1 differ-
ential. Thus, the corresponding row of Table 2 gives the anomaly corresponding
to linear structures.
We can also compute the anomaly associated to the TKlog structure [34]
used in the S-box of Streebog and Kuznyechik [22,23] called 𝜋 ∈ S28 . A TKlog
is a 2𝑚-bit permutation parametrized by an affine function 𝜅 : F𝑚2 → F22𝑚 such
18
that 𝜅(𝑥) = 𝛬(𝑥) ⊕ 𝜅(0) for some linear function 𝛬. This function must be such
that Im(𝛬) ∪ F2𝑚 spans F22𝑚 . The TKlog also depends on a permutation 𝑠 of













= 𝜅(2𝑚 − 𝑖) + 𝛼(2𝑚+1)𝑠(𝑗), for 𝑖 < 2𝑚 + 1, 𝑗 < 2𝑚 − 1 ,
(3)
where 𝛼 is a root of a primitive polynomial 𝑝 of degree 2𝑚, so that 𝛼2
𝑚+1 is a
multiplicative generator of F*2𝑚 . The number of TKlog, is then given by
2𝑚−1∏︁
𝑖=𝑚
(22𝑚 − 2𝑖)⏟  ⏞  
𝛬





)︀⏟  ⏞  
#primitive polynomials
× 22𝑚⏟ ⏞ 
𝜅(0)
where 𝜑 is Euler’s totient function. As for the inverse function, the encoding of
the elements of F22𝑚 as binary strings can be considered to be part of the outer
affine layers.
Structure. Parameters 𝑛 = 6 𝑛 = 8 𝑛 = 12 𝑛 = 16
𝑥 ↦→ 𝑥2
𝑛−2 – 236.1 1570.6 42981.2 953548.5
TKlog
“pure” 258.7 1601.5 42870.7 952207.7
AE 184.3 1469.0 42574.2 951683.2
TU-dec.
𝑡 = 1 8.8 95.7 1997.7 32699.7
𝑡 = 𝑛/2 13.0 201.1 5215.3 91571.2
SPN
ASASA, 𝑆/𝑟 = 2 192.7 1435.4 41913.5 947036.0
ASASASA, 𝑆/𝑟 = 2 158.2 1342.3 41316.3 943662.7
Feistel
3-round, 𝐹𝑖 ∈ S2𝑛/2 205.5 1443.3 41898.2 946980.9
4-round, 𝐹𝑖 ∈ S2𝑛/2 220.8 1487.6 42194.2 948664.9
Table 2: Upper bounds on the anomalies of the affine-equivalence to some struc-
tures. For the TKlog, “AE” corresponds to permutations affine-equivalent to
some TKlog and “pure” to TKLog themselves. 𝑆/𝑟 is the number of S-boxes
used in each round, i.e. the number that are applied in parallel.
4 Vector Spaces Extraction Algorithms
Let 𝒮 be a set of elements of F𝑛2 . In this section, we describe an algorithm
which extracts all the vector spaces of dimension at least 𝑑 that are completely
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contained in 𝒮. As established in the previous section, the ability to solve this
problem will allow us to identify TU-decompositions, some SPNs, and 3,4-round
Feistel networks even in the presence of affine encodings. It can also test the
CCZ-equivalence [16] of a function to a permutation, as was done by Dillon et
al. [13] to find the first APN permutation operating on an even number of bits.
Our results can be interpreted using both the ordering relation over the inte-
gers and by reasoning over the respective position of the zeroes of the elements
in F𝑛2 . The following lemma links these two views.
Definition 4 (Most Significant Bit). Let 𝑥 ∈ F𝑛2 and let us write 𝑥 =
(𝑥[0], ..., 𝑥[𝑛 − 1]) where 𝑥[0] is the least significant bit. We denote MSB(𝑥) the
greatest index 𝑖 such that 𝑥[𝑖] = 1.
Lemma 2. For any 𝑥 ∈ F𝑛2 , it holds that
𝑥 < 𝑥⊕ 𝑎 ⇔ 𝑥[MSB(𝑎)] = 0 ,
where the order relation is obtained by interpreting 𝑥 and 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑎 as the binary
representations of integers.
4.1 A Simple Approach and How Ours Improves It
Let us first present a naive approach to solving this problem. At its core, this
approach is a tree search that builds the complete vector spaces iteratively.
Starting from a specific element 𝑥 ∈ 𝒮 and vector space 𝑉𝑥 = {0, 𝑥}, we
loop over all the elements 𝑦 such that 𝑦 > 𝑥 and check whether (𝑥⊕ 𝑦) ∈ 𝒮, in
which case we build 𝑉𝑥,𝑦 = 𝑉𝑥 ∪ {𝑦 ⊕ 𝑣, 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉𝑥}. We then repeat this process
by looking for 𝑧 > 𝑦 such that (𝑧 ⊕ 𝑣) ∈ 𝒮 for all 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉𝑥,𝑦. This process can
then be iterated until complete bases (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, ...) of vector spaces are found. Our
approach is based on the same principles but it significantly outperforms this
naive algorithm by solving its two main shortcomings.
First, the basis of a vector space is not unique. The condition that it be
ordered, which is implied by the algorithm sketched above, is not sufficient to
ensure uniqueness. This implies that the algorithm will be slowed down by the
exploration of the branches that actually correspond to identical spaces, and
that a post processing checking for duplicated spaces will be needed. Our al-
gorithm will solve this problem and return exactly one basis for each vector
space contained in 𝒮. These bases are called Gauss-Jordan Bases (GJB) and are
introduced in Section 4.2.
Second, at each iteration, we need to consider all 𝑧 ∈ 𝒮 such that 𝑧 is strictly
larger than the largest vector already in the basis being built. In our approach,
we update at each iteration a set that contains all the elements 𝑧 that could be
used to construct a larger basis using a process which we call vector extraction
(see Section 4.3). Like in the algorithm above, this set only contains elements
that are strictly greater than the previous bases elements. However, it is also
strictly larger than all the elements in the vector space spanned by this basis
and its size is reduced by at least a factor 2 at each iteration. Using vector
20
extractions, we can also skip the test that (𝑧 ⊕ 𝑣) ∈ 𝒮 for all 𝑣 in the current
vector space which will increase the speed of our algorithm.
Besides, in each iteration, we use a heuristic method to consider only a subset
of this set of 𝑧 which is based on the number and positions of its zeroes, the Bigger
MSB Condition.
In summary, we improve upon the algorithm above in the following ways:
– we construct exactly one basis per vector space contained in 𝒮 (using GJB,
see Section 4.2),
– we significantly reduce the number of vectors that can be considered in the
next iterations (using vector extractions, see Section 4.3), and
– we further decrease the number of vectors that need to be explored at a
given iteration using a specific filter (using the Bigger MSB condition, see
Section 4.4).
Finally, the vector space extraction algorithm itself is presented in Section 4.5.
An algorithm extracting affine spaces which uses the former as a subroutine is
presented along with an actual implementation of the vector space algorithm in
the appendix of the full version [10].
In [14], Canteaut et al. introduced an algorithm which, given an 𝑛-bit Boolean
function 𝑓 , lists all the affine spaces of dimension 𝑚 such that 𝑓 is constant (or
affine) on them. Our algorithm can easily perform the same task. Indeed, 𝑓 is
affine on a subspace 𝑈 if and only if {𝑥||𝑓(𝑥), 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈} is an affine subspace,
meaning that our affine space search algorithms can list all such spaces.
Using our implementation (see [10]), we only need about 12 min to reprove
their Fact 22 which deals with a 14-bit Boolean function while they claim a
runtime of 50 h in this case. Our machine is more recent and thus likely faster
than theirs but not by a factor 250: our algorithm is inherently more efficient.
It is also far more versatile, as we have established above.
4.2 Gauss-Jordan Bases
These objects are those which our vector space search will actually target. They
were described in the context of Boolean functions in [14].
Definition 5 (GJB [14]). For any vector space 𝑉 of dimension 𝑑, the Gauss-
Jordan Basis (GJB) of 𝑉 is the set {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑑−1} such that ⟨𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑑−1⟩ = 𝑉
which is the smallest such set when sorted in lexicographic order.
For any space 𝑉 there is exactly one GJB. Indeed, we can write down all of its
bases, sort the elements in each of them in increasing order and then sort the
reordered bases in lexicographic order. This implies that 𝑣𝑖 < 𝑣𝑖+1 for all 𝑖. Some
key properties of GJBs are given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3. GJBs have the following properties.
1. If {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖} is the GJB of ⟨𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖⟩ then {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖−1} is a GJB.
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2. The basis {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑑−1} is a GJB if and only if{︃
∀𝑗 ∈ {0, ..., 𝑑− 2}, MSB(𝑣𝑗) < MSB(𝑣𝑗+1)
∀𝑖 ∈ {1, ..., 𝑑− 1},∀𝑗 ∈ {0, ..., 𝑖− 1}, 𝑣𝑖[MSB(𝑣𝑗)] = 0 .
(4)
3. If {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑑−1} is a GJB then, for all 𝑗 ∈ {0, ..., 𝑑−1}, ⟨𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑑−1⟩ contains
exactly 2𝑗 elements 𝑥 such that MSB(𝑥) = MSB(𝑣𝑗).
Proof. We prove each point separately.
Point 1. A basis of ⟨𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖−1⟩ lexicographically smaller than {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖} could
be used to build a basis of ⟨𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖⟩, lexicographically smaller than its GJB,
which is impossible.
Point 2. We prove each direction of the equivalence separately.
⇒ Suppose that {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑑−1} is indeed a GJB. Then MSB(𝑣𝑗) = MSB(𝑣𝑗+1)
would imply that MSB(𝑣𝑗 ⊕ 𝑣𝑗+1) < MSB(𝑣𝑗) which, in particular, would
imply that 𝑣𝑗⊕𝑣𝑗+1 < 𝑣𝑗 . This would contradict that {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑑−1} is a GJB.
Similarly, MSB(𝑣𝑗) > MSB(𝑣𝑗+1) would imply 𝑣𝑗 > 𝑣𝑗+1 which is also a
contradiction. We deduce that MSB(𝑣𝑗) < MSB(𝑣𝑗+1) for any 0 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑑−1.
Suppose now that 𝑣𝑖[MSB(𝑣𝑗)] = 1 for some 𝑗 < 𝑖. We deduce from Lemma 2
that 𝑣𝑖 ≥ 𝑣𝑖 ⊕ 𝑣𝑗 , which is again a contradiction because {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑑−1} is
minimal. We have thus established that if {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑑−1} is a GJB then it
must satisfy the conditions in Equation (4).
⇐ Let us now assume that these conditions hold. In this case, we have that
𝑣𝑖 < 𝑣𝑖 ⊕
⨁︀
𝑗∈𝐼 𝑣𝑗 for any subset 𝐼 of {0, ..., 𝑖 − 1} because the MSB of⨁︀
𝑗∈𝐼 𝑣𝑗 is always strictly smaller than MSB(𝑣𝑖) and because of Lemma 2.
Thus, adding 𝑣𝑖 at the end of {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖−1} yields a GJB of ⟨𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖⟩. A
simple induction then gives us the result.
Point 3. Using the first point of this lemma allows us to proceed via a simple
induction over the size of the basis. If the basis is simply {𝑣0} then the lemma
obviously holds. Then, adding an element 𝑣𝑑 to the end of a GJB of size 𝑑 will
add 2𝑑 elements 𝑥 such that MSB(𝑥) = MSB(𝑣𝑑). ⊓⊔
The last point of Lemma 3 allows a significant speed up of the search for
such GJBs. To describe it, we introduce the following concept.
Definition 6 (MSB spectrum). Let 𝒮 be a set of elements in F𝑛2 . The MSB
spectrum of 𝒮 is the sequence {N𝑖(𝒮)}0≤𝑖<𝑛 such that
N𝑖(𝒮) = # {𝑥 ∈ 𝒮,MSB(𝑥) = 𝑖} .
Corollary 3 (MSB conditions). If a set 𝒮 of elements from F𝑛2 contains a
vector space of dimension 𝑑, then there must exist a strictly increasing sequence
{𝑚𝑗}0≤𝑗≤𝑑−1 of length 𝑑 such that
N𝑚𝑗 (𝑆) ≥ 2𝑗 .
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4.3 Vector Extractions
We now present a class of functions called extractions which will play a crucial
role in our algorithms. We also prove their most crucial properties.
Definition 7 (Extraction). Let 𝑎 ̸= 0 be some element of F𝑛2 . The extraction
of 𝑎, denoted 𝒳𝑎, is a function mapping a subset 𝒮 of F𝑛2 to 𝒳𝑎(𝒮), where 𝑥 ∈
𝒳𝑎(𝒮) if and only if all of the following conditions are satisfied:
𝑥 ∈ 𝒮 , (𝑥⊕ 𝑎) ∈ 𝒮 , 𝑎 < 𝑥 < (𝑥⊕ 𝑎) .
In particular, 𝒳𝑎(𝒮) ⊆ 𝒮. Our algorithm will iterate such extractions to construct
smaller and smaller sets without loosing any GJBs. This process is motivated
by the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Let {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖−1} be elements of some subset 𝒮 of F𝑛2 such that
0 ∈ 𝒮 and such that 𝑣𝑗+1 ∈ (𝒳𝑣𝑗 ∘ ... ∘ 𝒳𝑣0)(𝒮) for all 𝑗 < 𝑖. Then it holds that
𝑣𝑖 ∈ (𝒳𝑣𝑖−1 ∘ ...∘𝒳𝑣0)(𝒮) if and only if ⟨𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖⟩ ⊆ 𝒮 and {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖} is the GJB
of this vector space.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem, we proceed by induction over 𝑖 using the
validity of the theorem over bases of size 𝑖 as our induction hypothesis. At step
𝑖, we assume that 𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖 are elements of 𝒮 and that 𝑣𝑗+1 ∈ (𝒳𝑣𝑗 ∘ ... ∘ 𝒳𝑣0)(𝒮)
for all 𝑗 < 𝑖.
Initialization i = 1. By definition of vector extraction, 𝑣1 ∈ 𝒳𝑣0(𝒮) if and only
if 𝑣1 ∈ 𝒮, and 𝑣0 ⊕ 𝑣1 ∈ 𝒮, 𝑣0 < 𝑣1 < 𝑣0 ⊕ 𝑣1. As we assume 0, 𝑣0 ∈ 𝒮, this
is equivalent to {0, 𝑣0, 𝑣1, 𝑣0 ⊕ 𝑣1} = ⟨𝑣0, 𝑣1⟩ being contained in 𝒮 and to
{𝑣0, 𝑣1} being a GJB.
Inductive Step i > 1 Let 𝑣𝑖 ∈ (𝒳𝑣𝑖−1 ∘ ... ∘ 𝒳𝑣0)(𝒮). From the induction hy-
pothesis, we have that {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖−1} is a GJB. Using the second point of
Lemma 3, we have that its extension {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖} is a GJB if and only if
𝑣𝑖[MSB(𝑣𝑗)] = 0 (which is equivalent to 𝑣𝑖 < 𝑣𝑖 ⊕ 𝑣𝑗) for all 0 ≤ 𝑗 < 𝑖 and
MSB(𝑣𝑖) > MSB(𝑣𝑖−1).
By definition of 𝒳𝑣𝑗 , we have that 𝑣𝑖 < 𝑣𝑖 ⊕ 𝑣𝑗 for all 𝑗 such that 0 ≤ 𝑗 <
𝑖, so {𝑣0, ..., 𝑣𝑖} is a GJB if and only if MSB(𝑣𝑖) > MSB(𝑣𝑖−1). We have
𝑣𝑖−1 < 𝑣𝑖 < 𝑣𝑖 ⊕ 𝑣𝑖−1, which implies in particular 𝑣𝑖−1 < 𝑣𝑖 ⊕ 𝑣𝑖−1, so
that 𝑣𝑖[MSB(𝑣𝑖−1)] = 0. Thus, 𝑣𝑖 > 𝑣𝑖−1 holds if and only if MSB(𝑣𝑖) >
MSB(𝑣𝑖−1). ⊓⊔
Corollary 4. If {𝑒0, ..., 𝑒𝑑−1} is the GJB of a vector space 𝑉 such that 𝑉 ⊆
𝒮 ⊆ F𝑛2 then, for all 0 < 𝑗 ≤ 𝑑− 1, we have
⟨𝑒𝑗 , 𝑒𝑗+1, ..., 𝑒𝑑−1⟩ ⊆
(︀
𝒳𝑒𝑗−1 ∘ ...𝒳𝑒1 ∘ 𝒳𝑒0
)︀
(𝒮) .
Evaluating 𝒳𝑎 imposes a priori to look whether 𝑥 ⊕ 𝑎 belongs in 𝒮 for all
𝑥 ∈ 𝒮 such that 𝑥 < 𝑥⊕𝑎. This verification can be implemented efficiently using
a binary search when 𝒮 is sorted. We can make it even more efficient using the
following lemma.
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𝒳𝑎 ({𝑥 ∈ 𝒮,MSB(𝑥) = 𝑖})
4.4 Bigger MSB Condition
The following lemma provides a necessary condition for some 𝑒0 ∈ 𝒮 to be the
first element of a GJB of size 𝑑.
Lemma 5 (Bigger MSB condition). If 𝑒0 is the first element in a GJB of
size 𝑑 of elements of a set 𝒮 of elements in F𝑛2 , then 𝒮 ′ defined as
𝒮 ′ = {𝑥 ∈ 𝒮,MSB(𝑥) > MSB(𝑒0)}
must satisfy the MSB condition of Corollary 3 for dimension 𝑑− 1, i.e. there is
a strictly increasing sequence {𝑚𝑗} of length 𝑑− 1 such that
# {𝑥 ∈ 𝒮,MSB(𝑥) = 𝑚𝑗} > 2𝑗 .
This lemma provides an efficient filter to know whether 𝑥 can be the start of
a GJB of size 𝑑 which depends only on the MSB of 𝑥, so that it does not need to
be evaluated for all 𝑥 ∈ 𝒮 but only once for each subset of 𝒮 with a given MSB.
4.5 Vector Space Extraction Algorithm
Algorithm 1 GJBExtraction algorithm.
1: function GJBExtraction(𝒮, 𝑑)
2: ℒ ← {}
3: for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝜑𝑑 (𝒮) do
4: 𝑠𝑎 ← 𝒳𝑎(𝒮)
5: if |𝑠𝑎| ≥ 2𝑑−1 − 1 then
6: ℒ′ ← GJBExtraction (𝑠𝑎,max(𝑑− 1, 0))
7: for all 𝐵 ∈ ℒ′ do






If we let 𝜑𝑑 be the identity then we can directly deduce from Theorem 6 and
Corollary 4 that GJBExtraction (as described in Algorithm 1) returns the
unique GJBs of each and every vector space of dimension at least equal to 𝑑 that
is included in 𝒮.
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This algorithm can be seen as a tree search. The role of 𝜑𝑑 is then to cut
branches as early as possible by allowing us to ignore elements that cannot
possibly be the first element of a base of size 𝑑 by implementing the Bigger MSB
Condition of Lemma 5:
𝑎 ∈ 𝜑𝑑(𝒮) if and only if ∃{𝑚𝑗}0≤𝑗<𝑑,
{︃
𝑚𝑗+1 > 𝑚𝑗 > MSB(𝑎) ,
# {𝑥 ∈ 𝒮,MSB(𝑥) = 𝑚𝑗} > 2𝑗 .
Note that we only need to try and build such a sequence of increasing 𝑚𝑗
once for each value of MSB(𝑥) for 𝑥 ∈ 𝒮. It is possible to check for the existence
of such a sequence in a time proportional to |𝒮|.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a comprehensive list of anomalies quantifying how unlikely
the properties of a given S-box are. These can be of a statistical nature and we
have pioneered the use of the BCT for this purpose. They can also correspond
to the presence of a specific structure, many of which are particular cases of the
TU-decomposition. To find TU-decompositions, we presented an efficient vector
space algorithm which can be of independent interest. We have also showed
how finding TU-decompositions can help bypass affine masks for several S-box
structures.
We can apply our results to 𝜋, the 8-bit S-box used by both Streebog [22]
and Kuznyechik [23]. It has very high anomalies (see Table 3) which means that
the set of S-boxes with as strong a structure as the TKlog found in 𝜋 is very
small. This observation is coherent with the claim of [34] that the structure of
𝜋 was deliberately inserted by its designers.
Statistical Structural
Differential Linear Boomerang TU4 TKlog
80.6† 34.4 14.2 201.1 1601.5
† This anomaly might be overestimated (Sect. 2.4).
Table 3: Some of the anomalies of 𝜋.
We finally list some open problems that we have identified while working on
this paper.
Open Problem 1. How can we better estimate the differential anomaly?
Open Problem 2. Why are there so many vector spaces in 𝒵𝐹 when 𝐹 is a
3-round Feistel network of S28?
25
6 Acknowledgement
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